Learning from Failure: Real Project Lessons When ASM Handbook Volume 13C Was Not Properly Followed

The project was a high-profile retrofit of a chemical processing unit. The client needed to extend the service life of several large pressure vessels operating in a corrosive environment. The core challenge was selecting and applying a corrosion-resistant alloy (CRA) weld overlay on the existing carbon steel shells.

Our team had extensive experience with the base materials and the general welding procedures. The initial focus was on mechanical design and procurement, with the welding specification treated as a well-understood, commodity task. We referenced general material datasheets and past project specifications for the filler metal.

The assumption was that controlling heat input and achieving full fusion were the primary goals. This mindset, while technically correct in a narrow sense, set the stage for a cascade of quality and performance issues.

Where the Project Team Misjudged the Requirements

The first misjudgment was viewing the overlay purely as a cladding operation. The team specified a common nickel-based filler metal known for general corrosion resistance. We focused on deposition rate and cost, selecting a procedure that promised high productivity.

We did not adequately analyze the specific chemical environment within the vessel. The process stream contained trace elements—chlorides and sulfur compounds—that were not the primary corrodents but were critical for material selection. Our generic specification failed to account for their influence on microstructural stability.

A related error was treating the overlay as a monolithic, homogeneous barrier. The specification called for a certain thickness and bond strength, which are necessary but insufficient conditions. We overlooked the metallurgical evolution across the weld bead, the heat-affected zone (HAZ) of the substrate, and the fusion line.

How the Problems Manifested During Construction and Inspection

During production welding, everything looked good visually. The weld beads were uniform, and liquid penetrant testing showed no surface-breaking defects. The procedure qualification records (PQRs) met all the standard mechanical tests we had stipulated: bend tests, tensile tests on the composite coupon.

The first real sign of trouble came during routine ultrasonic testing (UT) after the first layer was applied. The inspectors reported inconsistent back-wall echoes and areas of signal scattering. Initially, this was attributed to the inherent difficulty of inspecting a clad surface. Some areas were ground smooth and retested, which temporarily satisfied the acceptance criteria.

The more serious issue emerged during hydrotesting. After the vessel was filled with water, several localized areas exhibited minor weeping. This was not from through-wall cracks, but from a network of fine, subsurface imperfections that connected during pressurization.

Post-hydrotest, detailed UT and metallographic sampling were ordered. The findings were revealing. The weld overlay contained isolated pockets of unacceptable microstructural phases. In other areas, the dilution profile was inconsistent, creating narrow bands where the corrosion resistance was severely compromised.

What Should Have Been Controlled Earlier

The root cause was a failure to control the weld chemistry and thermal history with the specific service environment in mind. We had controlled gross parameters like amperage and voltage, but not the intricate dance of solidification and subsequent thermal cycles.

The filler metal we chose, while nominally correct, had a balance of alloying elements that, under our specific welding parameters, promoted the formation of secondary phases in the weld metal. These phases are brittle and can be preferential sites for corrosion initiation, especially in the presence of chlorides.

Furthermore, our interpass temperature control was too lax. We aimed to stay below a maximum to avoid distorting the vessel, but we didn’t consider the cumulative effect of multiple thermal cycles on the previously deposited weld metal. This allowed undesirable elements to segregate and precipitate at grain boundaries.

The substrate preparation was also inadequate. We cleaned for welding but did not perform a detailed material verification of the original vessel shell. Variations in the base metal’s composition, particularly residual elements like sulfur and phosphorus, significantly affected the fusion line microstructure and its susceptibility to under-clad cracking.

How the Standard Guides Practical Mitigation

This is where a proper application of the principles in ASM Handbook Volume 13C moves from academic to essential. The handbook doesn’t just list materials; it frames the welding of corrosion-resistant alloys as a systems engineering problem.

It emphasizes the concept of “weld metal composition” versus “filler metal composition.” The final chemistry in the weld puddle is a function of the filler wire, the base metal dilution, and the flux or shielding gas. Our procedure, by not defining acceptable dilution limits and resultant chemistry ranges, allowed for a dangerous variance.

The resource provides detailed diagrams and explanations of solidification cracking susceptibility, phase formation diagrams for various alloy systems, and the impact of heat input on HAZ characteristics. It would have guided us to specify not just a generic alloy type, but a specific AWS classification with tight compositional controls for critical minor elements.

Most importantly, it shifts the qualification mindset. Instead of just qualifying a procedure to prove strength, it guides you to qualify it for corrosion performance. This might involve supplementary testing, like corrosion coupon testing from a representative weld sample in a simulated service environment, or stringent microstructural examination as part of the PQR.

The Cost of Rework and the Path Forward

The project incurred major delays and cost overruns. The remedial action was not a simple repair. The non-conforming overlay had to be completely removed by machining, a hazardous and time-consuming operation in a confined space.

A new welding procedure specification (WPS) was developed with a forensic focus on metallurgical outcomes. We selected a filler metal with a different major element balance and tighter impurity controls. The WPS now specified a narrow window for heat input, strict interpass temperature ranges, and a maximum dilution percentage.

Each weld coupon from the new PQR underwent full metallographic examination to verify the absence of detrimental phases. A corrosion test coupon was welded alongside production and sent for laboratory analysis.

The lesson was profound. We had treated a specialized, high-integrity process as a standard fabrication activity. The ASM Handbook Volume 13C is the collective wisdom of failures and successes in joining these advanced materials. It provides the connective tissue between a material’s datasheet and a reliable, fit-for-service weldment.

Ignoring its guidance doesn’t mean you can’t produce a weld that passes a code stamp. It means you might be producing a component that holds pressure today but will fail prematurely in service tomorrow. The true standard is not in the document itself, but in the disciplined, analytical approach it instills—an approach that asks “what can go wrong metallurgically?” long before the first arc is struck.